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Harm, Utility, and the Obligation to Obey the Law 
BY RICHARD DAGGER (TEMPE/ARIZONA) 
In a recent essay, "Political Obligation"1, R. M. Haré sets out a utilitarian 
account of the obligation to obey the law which he believes to be immune to an 
objection often brought against such accounts. In what follows I shall briefly 
review this objection and Professor Hare's response to it; than I shall go on to 
argue that Hare's response, ingenious as it is, fails to defeat the objection. Hare's 
argument is instructive nonetheless, for its failure tells us something about wrongs 
and harm as well as Utility and political obligation. 
1. 
In its simplest form, the objection to utilitarian accounts of the obligation to 
obey the law with which Professor Haré is concerned consists in pointing out 
that a conscientious utilitarian will break the law whenever he believes that he 
can achieve better results by breaking it than by following it. Thus it might be 
argued, to borrow an example from Hare, that a poor person ought to steal from 
a rieh one because, due to diminishing marginal Utility, this will produce a net 
gain in utility. And this means that the principie of utility is incompatible with 
an obligation to obey the law because the principie of utility counts for every 
thing and the obligation to obey counts for nothing. On the utilitarian account, 
in short, there is no obligation to obey the law. 
When it is put this way, the objection is easily met by utilitarians. As Hare 
and others have noted, the utilitarian's calculations are not complete until he 
considers all the conséquences, including the side-effeets, of law-breaking. Since 
these side-effects will usually involve some rather serious costs — Hare mentions 
"the cost of the police force, of locks and banks, the inconvenience and unplea 
santness of having to watch one's property or go in fear of losing it and the 
growth of general mistrust" (p. 8) - it is quite unlikely that breaking the law 
will produce a net gain in utility. 
As readers of David Lyons's Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism are aware, 
however, this objection can be put in a form more diffïcultfor the utilitarian. For 
if the utilitarian's appeal to side-effects meets the objection, the objector has 
only to point to cases where the side-effects are either negligible or non-existent. 
Such a situation arises when, in Hare's words, "one person can, by breaking a 
law, secure for himself an advantage at the cost of no comparable disadvantage 
to others, because he knows they are all going to keep the law, and it takes quite 
a large number of breaches of it to produce any substantial disutility" (p. 9). 
In Ted Honderich, ed., Social Ends and Political Means (London, Henley and Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 1-12. All citations in parentheses refer to this 
essay. 
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This may happen, for instance, when a government responds to a fuel shortage 
by ordering its Citizens to keep the températures in their homes at or below a 
certain level. In these circumstances a utilitarian has no need to worry about the 
side-effects of his law-breaking if he knows that his failure to comply will go 
undetected and that it will make no real différence to the success or failure of 
the conservation effort. The amount of fuel he consumes is an insignificant 
portion of the total, after all, so his non-compliance will bring hardship to no 
one; and if no one discovers his "free-riding", he will not be setting a bad 
example which threatens to undermine the government's conservation program. 
The utilitarian may conclude, therefore, that his enjoyment of a more comfort 
able température will actually maximize Utility because it is neither offset nor 
outweighed by other considérations. Even when all things are considered, then, 
the utilitarian in this and similar situations will decide that he ought to break the 
law. This is to say, once again, that Utility counts for everything, obligation for 
nothing. Thus utilitarianism fails to provide a satisfactory account of the obliga 
tion to obey the law. 
2. 
Professor Hare's response to this objection is to set out his own "universal 
prescriptive" version of utilitarianism. Whenever we must decide what we ought 
morally to do, Hare says, we must ask ourselves, 
" 'What universal principie of 
action can I accept for cases just like this, disregarding the fact that I occupy the 
place in the situation that I do (i.e., giving no preferential weight to my own 
interests just because they are mine?") (p. 3) This means that we must give 
"equal weight to the equal interests" of everyone likely to be affected by our 
actions, then devise and follow principies "which will in ail most promote those 
interests" (p. 3). If we follow this method, according to Hare, we are led to a 
form of utilitarianism, for the principies we prescribe must themselves be justi 
fied by an appeal to their utility. 
When the "universal-prescriptive" method is applied in the case of the utilitar 
ian and the fuel shortage, furthermore, we find — or Professor Hare finds — that 
the utilitarian must adopt a principie which requires him to comply with the 
order to lower the température in his home. He must do so because his failure to 
comply, even if it went unnoticed, would harm others by frustrating a desire 
"which nearly ail of us have, namely the desire not to be taken advantage of, 
even unknown to us" (p. 9). Since this desire is common, it appears that what 
ever the utilitarian will gain by breaking this law will be outweighed by the harm 
he does to others. What is true in this case will be true in others where the desire 
not to be taken advantage of is involved, of course, and this leads Hare to 
formúlate the following general reason for obeying the law: "The fact that, if I 
break the law, I shall be taking advantage of those who keep it out of law 
abidingness although they would like to do what it forbids, and thus harming 
them by frustrating their desire not to be taken advantage of' (p. 11). 
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3. 
The problem with Hare's argument is that it rests on an unacceptably broad view 
of what constitutes a harm. As he explains in another essay, "a man's interests 
are harmed not only when his actual feeling-states are adversely affected, but also 
when desires which he has (for example, not to be cheated) are, even unknown 
to him, frustrated"2. Now there is some truth to this, for it is certainly true that 
we may be harmed without being (or even becoming) aware of it. This could 
happen if a bank clerk were to divert funds from my account to his own, for 
instance. Given the way I handle my account, I might never notice that, a bit at 
a time, I had suffered a substantial loss. It is also true that we may be harmed 
when others frustrate our desires, such as the desire to be free from assault. But 
this is not to say, with Hare, that one is harmed whenever one's desires are 
frustrated. 
To see why this conception of harm is too broad, we need only think of cases 
where A undeniably frustrâtes B's desires, but it would nevertheless seem odd, at 
best, to say that B has been harmed by .4's action or inaction. Suppose that A is 
an employer and that B applies for a position, one he very much wants, with A 's 
firm. If A awards the position to someone eise, he has certainly frustrated B's 
desire to hold the position; but unless there are special circumstances, we can 
hardly say that A has harmed B. Or suppose that a pitcher in a baseball game 
strikes out a batter, thereby frustrating the batter's desire for a hit. Here again it 
would be out of place to say that the pitcher has harmed the batter. Or suppose, 
finally, that I insist that my daughter have soup, which she does not want, rather 
than cookies, which she does, for lunch. I admittedly frustrate her desire for 
cookies when I do this, but I do not believe that I harm her. Indeed, I should say 
that I would corne closer to harming her were I to give in to her demand for 
cookies. The point, however, is that in none of these cases, nor in a good many 
others which we may easily imagine, does the frustration of desires constitute a 
harm. Hare's conception of harm is too broad, in sum, because Hare does not 
recognize that one may be frustrated without being harmed. Once the con 
scientious utilitarian notices this, he will reject Hare's general reason for obeying 
the law. 
Perhaps this is unfair to Professor Hare. Perhaps what he means is not that the 
frustration of any desire whatsoever, but only the frustration of certain desires, 
counts as harm. This seems to be unobjectionable. If these certain desires include 
the desire not to be taken advantage of, furthermore, then Hare's general reason 
for obeying the law will stand. But can he demónstrate that this desire is indeed 
one of those whose frustration is harmful? Or, more generally, can Hare provide 
a rule for distinguishing those desires which may be harmlessly frustrated from 
those which may not? 
There are, I think, two différent ways in which Hare might try to draw this 
"The Argument from Received Opinion", in R. M. Hare, Essays on Philosophical Method 
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971), p. 131. 
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distinction. The first relies upon what Joel Feinberg calis "the orthodox jurispru 
dential analysis of harm as invaded interest"3. Following this conception of 
harm, Hare might maintain that the frustration of desires is harmful whenever it 
invades - or, more broadly, is contrary to - the interest of the person whose 
desires are frustrated4. This in turn would enable Hare to dismiss some troubling 
examples of the harmless frustration of desire. He might say, for instance, that I 
may frustrate my daughter's desire for cookies without harming her because I 
am acting in her interest, not invading or thwarting it, when I insist that she have 
soup for lunch. 
But what about the desire not to be taken advantage of or cheated? Are our 
interests invaded when this particular desire is frustrated? To this there is no 
ready answer; we must proceed case by case. If I were to lose money in a land 
swindle, I should say that I was cheated, that my interests were invaded, ànd 
that I was harmed. In other cases, though, including the kind of case which is 
crucial to Hare's argument, invasion of interest does not follow from the frustra 
tion of the desire not to be taken advantage of. This is demonstrated by further 
examination of the fuel shortage example, where we are assuming that the 
person who disobeys the conservation order escapes détection and deprives no 
one of the benefits of the program. If there is any invasion of interest in this 
case, it can only be because the person who disobeys is frustrating the desire of 
those who, while complying with the program, do not want others to take 
advantage of them. But does this really constitute an invasion of interest? It 
hardly seems so. Those who are taken advantage of are not suffering a loss of 
comfort or convenience or money or opportunity; and as long as they do not 
discover that someone is taking advantage of them, they will not even suffer the 
anguish or distress of knowing that one of their desires has been frustrated5. In 
these circumstances the conscientious utilitarian may well decide that his failure 
to comply with the conservation order will not only produce the best possible 
conséquences, but that it will do so without harming — without invading the 
interests of — anyone at all. Thus the "orthodox jurisprudential analysis of 
harm" fails to support Hare,s claim that we are harmed whenever our desire not 
to be taken advantage of is frustrated. 
"Harm and Self-Interest", in Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 45. Feinberg goes on to say, "A person 
is harmed when someone invades (blocks or thwarts) one of his interests". 
Haré himself defines 'harm' in a way that is similar to, but perhaps broader than, the 
jurisprudentiai analysis in his "Wrongness and Harm", in Hare, Essays on the Moral 
Concepts (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 92-109. 
There (p. 97) he says, "To harm somebody is to act against his interests". 
For a similar argument aimed in a différent direction - against the principie of fair play 
- see M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law? 
" in J. 
Feinberg and H. Gross, eds,, Law in PhilosophicalPerspective (Encino and Belmont, Ca.: 
Dickenson Publishing Co., 1977), p. 111. Smith's argument is actually misdirected, for 
the principie of fair play does not tie the obligation to obey the law to the harm which 
disobedience must necessarily produce. 
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The second way in which Professor Hare might try to support a distinction 
between desires which may be frustrated without harm and those which may not 
is by appealing to a more explicitly ethical conception of harm. Some desires 
may be rightfully frustrated, on this view, and others may not. This is to say that 
one is harmed whenever one is injured — injured, that is, in the sense of treated 
unjustly. This would allow Hare to handle the examples used against him earlier, 
for he could say that as long as my daughter, the batter, and the job seeker are 
not treated unjustly when their desires are frustrated, they are not being harmed. 
This way of drawing the distinction would also allow him to say that the utilitar 
ian in the fuel shortage example would be harming his countrymen if he were to 
set his thermostat higher than the law allows because he would be doing injury, 
or injustice, to them. 
This second coñception of harm, however, is no more successful than the first 
in providing Hare with the distinction he needs to save his utilitarian account of 
the obligation to obey the law. There are at least two reasons for this, the first 
being that the conception is simply unsatisfactory. It is not clear, that is, that 
one is actually harmed whenever he is treated unjustly. If the utilitarian in the 
fuel shortage example does set his thermostat at an illegally high level, he may 
frustrate the desires of many people who do not want others to take advantage 
of them; and if his failure to comply is discovered, he may well be accused of 
acting unjustly. Yet it seems, again, that he has actually harmed no one. If harm 
is mentioned at all in cases of this sort, it is not the "harm" of frustrating the 
desire not to be taken advantage of, or even the "harm" of treating others 
unjustly, but the harm that may occur when others follow the law-breaker's 
example, thereby undermining the conservation effort. 
But let us grant, for argument's sake, that we are harmed whenever we are 
treated unjustly. If Hare were to adopt this conception of harm, he would still 
face a second problem — a problem that is fatal to a utilitarian account of 
political obligation. This is that any attempt to distinguish those desires which 
may rightfully or justly be frustrated from those which may not must ultimately 
rely on a notion of rightness or justice. Such a notion must either dépend upon 
or be independent of the principie of utility. If it dépends upon the principie of 
utility - if we say that an action is right because it produces the best conséquen 
ces possible in the circumstances - then we are stuck with a utilitarian account 
of political obligation which remains open to the very objection which Hare is 
seeking to defeat. For what are the conséquences of frustrating the desires of 
others when the others never know that their desires have been frustrated? 
Given this utilitarian conception of harm, we should have to say, once more, 
that the utilitarian in the fuel shortage example is acting rightly when he dis 
obeys the order to conserve fuel. If something is harmful because it is unjust, 
and if injustice is doing what is contrary to the principie of utility, then the 
utilitarian does nothing harmful or unjust when he refuses to lower the setting of 
his thermostat. 
The alternative is to follow a conception of rightness or justice which is 
independent of the principie of utility. But this would also be unsatisfactory, 
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from Hare's point of view, because such a conception is incompatible with 
utilitarianism. And as long as Hare cannot establish, on utilitarian grounds, that 
the frustration of the desire not to be taken advantage of is harmful, then we 
must conclude that his conception of harm is unacceptably broad and his ac 
count of the obligation to obey the law unsatisfactory. 
4. 
There is at least one point on which Professor Hare and I agree, and that is 
that those who break the law in situations such as the fuel shortage example 
wrong those who comply with it. Our reasons for holding this view, however, are 
quite différent. Hare believes that those who break the law in these circumstan 
ces wrong those who abide by it because they harm them. I believe that the 
law-breakers wrong the law-abiders despite the fact that they do not harm them. 
My point, then, is simply that one may be wronged - taken advantage of, 
deceived, cheated, treated unjustly or unfairly - without being harmed6. 
If his account of the obligation to obey the law is to be a utilitarian account, 
Professor Hare must oblitérate this distinction. It is not enough to say that one 
ought not to take advantage of others;/fore must show that one ought not to do 
this because doing so would harm the others in some way. But he cannot do this, 
as we have seen, without stretching the notion of harm farther than it will go. 
Hare's account, consequently, is as open to the objection in question as any 
other utilitarian account of the obligation to obey the law. For a more satisfac 
tory account, we shall have to draw upon a moral theory which not only dis 
tinguishes wrongs from harms, but also explains why one is wronged when he is 
taken advantage of, deceived, or treated unfairly. Such a theory will rest on 
rights and respect for persons, not Utility. 
Résumé/Zusammenfassung 
Le préjudice, l'utilité et l'obligation d'obéir à la loi: Dans un essai récent, R. M. 
Hare donne un récit utilitaire de l'obligation d'obéir à la loi qu'il croit être à 
l'abri d'une objection qu'on fait souvent à de tels essais. Dans le récit présent 
cette objection et la réponse de Hare sont exposé brièvement. Ensuite l'auteur 
prêtent que la réponse du Professeur Hare ne réussit pas à réfuter l'objection. 
Cela est dû à la conception que Hare tient de la notion préjudice, qui est irrece 
vablement large, parce qu'il ne distingue pas entre injustice et préjudice. Dans sa 
Suppose that Jones, who is known widely as Smith's enemy, tells vicious lies about 
Smith in an attempt to ruin him. Suppose also that no one believes these lies and that 
Smith never learns of Jones's slanderous actions. Has Jones harmed Smith? Has he 
wronged him? I should answer "no" to the first question and "yes" to the second. I 
should also say that a moral theory which would lead us to conclude that Jones has not 
wronged Smith unless he has harmed him is, at best, morally impoverished. 
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conclusion l'auteur prétend qu'on trouve une explication convaincante de l'obli 
gation d'obéir à la loi dans une théorie morale, qui dépend des droits et du res 
pect pour les individus et non de l'utilité. 
Schaden, Utilität und die Gehorsamspflicht gegenüber dem Recht: R. M. Hare 
liefert in einem neueren Aufsatz eine utilitaristische Rechtfertigung der Gehor 
samspflicht gegenüber dem Recht, die seiner Meinung nach gegen den Einwand 
immun ist, der oftmals gegen Rechtfertigungen dieser Art vorgebracht wird. Im 
vorliegenden Aufsatz werden dieser Einwand und Professor Hares Antwort 
darauf kurz dargelegt; darauf aufbauend wird argumentiert, daß Hare s Antwort 
diesen Einwand nicht widerlegt. Der Grund hierfür liegt in Hare s Begriff von 
Schaden, der zu breit gefaßt ist, und er ist zu breit gefaßt, da er Schaden von 
Unrecht nicht unterscheidet. Um eine zufriedenstellende Theorie der Gehorsams 
pflicht gegenüber dem Recht zu erhalten, so schließt der Autor, müssen wir uns 
einer Moraltheorie zuwenden, die auf Rechten und Menschenwürde und nicht 
auf Utilität beruht. 
